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1. Introduction 
This paper seeks to show that the relevance of the so-called attitudinal utterances 
lies in something that may be too obvious – the expression of attitudes – but which is 
fundamental for the achievement of communicative effects such as rapport, 
solidarity, affinity, etc., on which social relations crucially depend. It argues that the 
achievement of such effects depends on the attribution of not only beliefs and 
implications that can be derived from those beliefs, but also of attitudes, feelings and 
emotions. Additionally, this paper also contends that the repetition of attitudinal 
utterances that may have been previously produced by an individual other than the 
speaker or utterances whose content resembles that of other previous attitudinal 
utterances may be interpreted as phatic. As a result, the relevance of those utterances 
resides in a combination of attitudes that is also essential for the achievement of the 
effects mentioned.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Firstly, it explains and exemplifies what 
attitudinal utterances are. Secondly, it addresses the problem of the relevance of 
these utterances and hypothesises about the mental operations that may take place in 
the hearer’s mind for the communicative effects mentioned to arise. Finally, this 
paper considers what may happen when past attitudinal utterances produced by the 
hearer or an individual other than the speaker or attitudinal utterances similar to past 
ones produced by them are repeated and why the effects mentioned may originate. 
 
 
2. Attitudinal utterances 
Consider the following utterances: 
(1) That shirt looks great on you! 
(2) I really like the way you dress! 
(3) That is a good idea. 
(4) You did a great job!/Great job! 
(5) What a beautiful house! 
In contexts in which the addressee is wearing a beautiful, new shirt (1), always 
appears in fashionable, expensive cloth (2), has made a good and quite reasonable 
suggestion (3), has done something in the appropriate or expected way (4) or has just 
shown his house to the speaker (5), these utterances would be regarded as 
compliments. For utterances like these to be interpreted as compliments, the speaker 
must show admiration or approval towards some personal trait, action, object or 
achievement which can be attributed or is related to the hearer, and which both the 
speaker and the hearer value or judge positively (Wolfson and Manes 1980; Manes 
and Wolfson 1981; Wolfson 1983; Holmes and Brown 1987; Holmes 1988; Herbert 
1989, 1990, 1991; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1989; Jaworski 1995). In Searle’s 
(1969) taxonomy of speech acts, compliments fall within the group of expressives 
because their propositional content specifies the speaker’s reaction towards a state of 
affairs in which she has an active or passive role. What is therefore important to note 
is that with compliments the speaker – or complimenter – expresses an attitude, and 
the attitude she expresses is one of admiration or approval towards the complimented 
personal trait, action, object or achievement or the complimented person – i.e. the 
complimentee. The expression and recognition of this attitude is fundamental for the 
interpretation of utterances as compliments. If the speaker did not express this 
attitude and/or the hearer did not recognise it, the hearer could interpret these 
utterances not as compliments, but differently: as criticism, complaints, ironies or, if 
the assumptions that they make manifest were already manifest to the hearer (cfr. 
Žegarac 1998) and he thought that the speaker’s intention was to ‘break the ice’ or 
avoid silence by saying something nice, as mere phatic remarks. 
Consider now the following utterances: 
(6) You are late! 
(7) Why don’t you shut up? 
(8) It is getting hard to live in this city. 
(9) The noise in this street is simply unbearable. 
(10) Opera performances at Maestranza are so expensive! 
In situations in which the hearer is late to a date (6), is speaking and disturbing 
his classmates (7), the living conditions in a city are getting worse (8), there is too 
much noise in a street at night (9) or certain performances at a theatre are 
unaffordable (10), these utterances would be examples of complaints. As opposed to 
compliments, with complaints the speaker – or complainer – does not express a 
feeling of approval or admiration, but a wide array of negative feelings, emotions or 
attitudes that comprise frustration, discomfort, dissatisfaction, discontent, 
displeasure, disapproval, censure, grievance, culpability, negligence, anxiety, 
indignation, etc. These feelings, emotions or attitudes are projected towards the 
hearer’s or someone else’s present or past behaviour, or towards some event or state 
of affairs. Complaints can be targeted to the hearer (6, 7), in which case they are 
direct, or to some event, state of affairs or individual other than the hearer (8-10), in 
which case they are indirect. Traditionally, complaints have also been considered 
cases of expressives (Searle 1969) because of the expression of a feeling, emotion or 
attitude or different converging ones. As in the case of compliments, the expression 
and recognition of a particular attitude is also essential for the interpretation of some 
utterances as complaints (Edmondson and House 1981; Boxer 1993; Olshtain and 
Weinbach 1993; Trosborg 1995; Günthner 1997; Dersley and Wootton 2000; 
Edwards 2000; Laforest 2002; Acuña Ferreira 2002-2003, 2004; Edwards 2005; Lee 
2006; Yoon 2007). 
Compliments and complaints were included in the group of what Edmondson and 
House (1981) labelled attitudinal illocutions. With these illocutions or speech acts, 
the speaker expresses a positive or negative attitude towards a particular event or 
state of affairs. Attitudinal illocutions can be about a future event (re future event) or 
a current or past event (re non-future event). Among the former, Edmondson and 
House (1981: 49) listed requests, suggestions, invitations, permissions, wishes and 
resolutions, while among the latter they included apologies, excuses, thanks, 
mitigations, congratulations or condolences. Although in some cases it is relatively 
easy to see that the speaker expresses an attitude with these speech acts, in others it is 
not that easy to identify what her attitude may be.  
However, there are more utterances wherewith the speaker expresses attitudes, 
which did not appear in Edmondson and House’s (1981) classification. For example, 
Carston (1996) has shown that denials express an attitude of rejection or dissociation 
from an utterance or thought that the speaker attributes to the hearer or someone else. 
Thus, in the following example the second speaker rejects or dissociates from the 
first speaker’s belief that she is in a particular mood: 
(11) Peter: Oh, you’re in a miserable foul mood tonight! 
Mary: I’m not in a miserable foul mood; I’m a little tired and would like 
to be left alone. (Carston 1996: 322) 
Similarly, Blakemore (1994) and Noh (1995, 1998, 2000) have argued that with 
echo-questions the speaker expresses a questioning attitude towards another 
utterance or thoughts that she attributes to another individual: 
(12) Peter: You finally managed to solve the problems. 
Mary: Managed? I solved them in two minutes. (Noh 2000: 218) 
Finally, another type of utterance wherewith the speaker expresses an attitude is 
ironic utterances. Consider now the examples below (13-17) produced in contexts in 
which it is manifest to the interlocutors that the living conditions in a particular city 
are horrible because of traffic, house prices, unemployment, etc. (13); that the 
speaker does not like the hearer to shout at her or when he speaks to her very loudly 
(14); that the speaker would not like to get home after a hard day of work and find on 
the table an extremely disgusting and disappointing dinner waiting for her (15); that 
the mayor of a city is not doing anything to keep the city clean (16), or that an opera 
singer’s performance was not satisfactory (17): 
(13) Seville, the city to live in! 
(14) I really love you when you shout at me! 
(15) When you get home after a hard day of work, there is nothing like a good 
dish of cold soup and a good dish of incredibly greasy spinach! 
(16) Alfred is so efficient as mayor! He always keeps the city clean for 
tourists! 
(17) Sofia’s performance was splendid. 
The utterances would be clearly ironic. In relevance-theoretic pragmatics 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson 1999, 2000, 2001-2002; Wilson and 
Sperber 2002, 2004), ironic utterances are described as interpretive utterances with 
which the speaker metarepresents other possible utterances or thoughts with a similar 
content. Ironic utterances do not make truthful assertions, but faithful interpretations 
of the speaker’s or someone else’s utterances or thoughts, so they are attributive 
metarepresentations (Wilson 1999: 143). However, what is remarkable is that the 
speaker expresses her own attitude towards the utterances or thoughts she 
metarepresents, so ironic utterances are echoic interpretive metarepresentations. As 
such, they achieve an optimal level of relevance because of the speaker’s expression 
of her attitude, which can be one of dissociation, rejection or disapproval of the 
proposition expressed. The relevance of ironic utterances lies precisely in the 
expression of such an attitude. In relevance-theoretic pragmatics, denials and echo-
questions are also analysed as cases of echoic metarepresentations because of the 
expression of an attitude of rejection or questioning, respectively, and as attributive 
metarepresentations because of the attribution of thoughts or utterances to some other 
individual. 
 
3. On the relevance of attitudinal utterances 
The expression of a particular attitude is fundamental for the interpretation of 
attitudinal utterances. These utterances achieve an optimal degree of relevance when 
the hearer perceives and recognises the attitude the speaker expresses. Such 
recognition involves the recovery of explicatures, a process in which the hearer may 
rely on linguistic elements such as mood indicators, interjections or prosody; 
paralinguistic elements such as the speaker’s facial expressions or gestures, and his 
own encyclopaedic information regarding the speaker’s likes, opinions, possible 
reactions when facing particular situations, etc. Besides, the recovery of the 
explicature of an utterance also involves a certain degree of mind-reading abilities 
and attribution of mental states. Depending on whether the hearer is aware of certain 
linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic information and reads the speaker’s mind 
in one direction or another – and, consequently, attributes a particular mental state to 
the speaker – he will conclude that the speaker has a particular attitude towards the 
propositional content of the utterance or the content she has metarepresented. And, 
depending on the attitude the hearer feels or has evidence to think the speaker has, he 
will interpret an attitudinal utterance in one way or another.  
However, attitudinal utterances such as compliments, indirect complaints, ironies 
and denials may also achieve an optimal level of relevance as a consequence of the 
communicative effects they produce. In the literature, compliments and indirect 
complaints are often said to favour social relationships because of their contribution 
to the generation of rapport, solidarity or affect between interlocutors. Rather than 
being face-threatening acts (Brown and Levinson 1987), they would be face-
enhancing, face-boosting or face-satisfying acts1 (Laver 1974, 1981; Wolfson and 
Manes 1980; Manes and Wolfson 1981; Wolfson 1983; Herbert 1989, 1990; 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1989; Jaworski 1995; Günthner 1997; Drew 1998; Boyle 
                                               
1
 The term face-enhancing act is used by Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1992, 1997) and Sifianou (1995, 1997), 
while other authors prefer terms such as face-boosting (Bayraktaroglu, 1991) or face-satisfying 
(Hickey and Vázquez Orta, 1994). 
2000; Acuña-Ferreira 2002-2003; Edwards 2005). Regarding compliments, 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk comments that these utterances “[…] make the 
addressee feel good by saying something nice to him/her, in this way satisfying the 
addressee’s expectations rather than expressing a position judgement for a referential 
or informative reason […]” (1989: 75). Concerning indirect complaints, despite the 
negative interactive outcomes that can be linked to some direct complaints, Günthner 
(1997), Drew (1998), Acuña Ferreira (2002-2003, 2004) and Edwards (2005) have 
found that indirect complaints about a third party function as an efficient interactive 
mechanism of association between interlocutors and result in emotional reciprocity, 
rapport, strengthening of their links of solidarity, re-affirmation of complicity or the 
construction of a common identity. Ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions may 
also achieve an optimal level of relevance in the same way and contribute to rapport, 
solidarity and affect with the hearer or some other individual who may have a similar 
attitude to the one the speaker expresses with these utterances. The problem now is to 
account for how such effects may arise, which amounts to address the mental 
operations that may take place in the hearer’s mind when processing this type of 
utterances. 
It is necessary to take into account two important facts. On the one hand, the 
recognition of an attitude is fundamental for the correct interpretation of attitudinal 
utterances, and such recognition requires metarepresentation. Just in the same way 
individuals can make attributions of beliefs, they can make attributions of attitudes. 
On the other hand, although attitudinal utterances express the speaker’s own attitude 
towards something, that very expression of an attitude or the propositional content of 
the utterance may also provoke a particular reaction to the hearer, who may therefore 
have another attitude which may coincide with that of the speaker’s. 
In many communicative situations, the effects associated with attitudinal 
utterances may arise fortuitously. When the speaker produces an attitudinal utterance 
and expresses her attitude towards something – whatever that attitude may be – and 
the hearer processes that utterance, he has to recover the explicature of that utterance. 
As has been said, such process involves the exploitation of linguistic, paralinguistic 
and extralinguistic information and metarepresentation. Taking that information into 
account, the hearer may attribute a particular attitude to the speaker and, as a result, 
end up with a particular propositional-attitude description. Such an attitude 
attribution or the propositional content of the utterance may in turn cause him to 
experience some feelings or emotions or have a particular attitude, too. If the hearer 
feels that the feelings, emotions or attitude towards the facts, events, objects or states 
of affairs alluded to in the utterance, which he then experiences, correspond to the 
one he has attributed to the speaker, the production of attitudinal utterances may 
result in rapport, solidarity, affect, reciprocity, affinity or ties of union. This may be 
so because the hearer perceives that he and the speaker share the same attitude 
towards those facts, events, objects or states of affairs. 
The relevance of attitudinal utterances may certainly reside in their contribution 
to rapport, solidarity and affect. In previous work, I have also argued that these 
effects may arise as a result of an intersection of both interlocutors’ cognitive 
environments (Padilla Cruz 2004, 2005, 2007, in press). When uttering a 
compliment, an indirect complaint, an ironic utterance, a denial or an echo-question, 
some of the assumptions that the speaker metarepresents and makes manifest to the 
hearer may be similar to those the hearer can retrieve from memory or construct on 
the fly during interpretation. This is virtually possible because both individuals share 
a physical setting and cognitive abilities (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 41). The fact that 
they interact in the same physical setting and think that they have similar abilities 
provides them with evidence about what is more or less likely for them to entertain 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 45). From the assumptions that become manifest to the 
hearer, he can derive further weak assumptions about what the speaker is thinking. In 
other words, the hearer can have intuitions about what the speaker thinks and 
attribute to the speaker the manifestness of assumptions that are similar to those that 
are manifest to him at that moment. For those assumptions to be in fact similar, the 
hearer must also sense that the speaker can derive contextual or logical implications 
that are, in turn, similar to those he can derive from those assumptions. 
The situation described so far is one in which interlocutors typically may not 
know each other or the speaker may not know what the hearer is likely to think about 
particular facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs or his attitude towards them. In 
this situation, there may arise a fortuitous intersection of both interlocutors’ cognitive 
environments, as a result of which the hearer may feel that his thoughts are to some 
extent similar to those of the speaker’s, or it may become manifest to the hearer that 
the attitude that the speaker expresses coincides with the one he has towards the 
facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs mentioned in attitudinal utterances. In 
this situation, the speaker has not sought to produce the effects associated with phatic 
utterances on purpose; rather, they arise as a direct consequence of the hearer’s 
attribution of an attitude to the speaker; the manifestness of some assumptions 
constituting the speaker’s informative intention which lead the hearer to have an 
attitude similar to the one that he attributes to the speaker, or the hearer’s intuition 
that the speaker can or may derive some implications from the assumptions manifest 
to her – which she also makes manifest to the hearer – which are similar to the ones 
the hearer has derived. In other situations, however, interlocutors know each other 
and may have some intuitions or evidence about their respective opinions about or 
attitudes towards some facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs. 
 
4. On the relevance of repeated or recurrent attitudinal utterances 
In many cases, individuals may possess some knowledge about the assumptions 
that their interlocutors may entertain about some aspects of reality on some 
occasions, maybe because they have interacted before, have mentioned something 
about those aspects of reality or belong to the same cultural group. In such situations, 
the speaker may intentionally seek or provoke an intersection of her cognitive 
environment with that of the hearer by uttering compliments, indirect complaints, 
denials, echo-questions or ironic utterances about facts, events, states of affairs with 
which she thinks the hearer is also acquainted.  
The speaker may be aware of what the hearer’s attitude towards some facts, 
states of affairs or object is likely to be as a consequence of having previously or 
repeatedly interacted with him and, therefore, read his mind. Although the hearer’s 
attitude or feelings towards that fact, state of affairs, object, etc. might obviously 
have changed over time, the speaker may have some intuitions about what they 
might be. As a result, he may attribute to the hearer some attitude, emotion or feeling 
towards some fact, state of affairs or object and produce an utterance wherewith he 
expresses an attitude that is the same as or similar to the one she thinks or believes 
the hearer has towards that object, state of affairs, etc. When the hearer exploits the 
linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic information and reads the speaker’s mind 
in order to recover the explicature of the utterance and checks that the propositional-
attitude description he recovers coincides to a greater or lesser extent with his own 
attitude toward that fact, event, object, etc., he will probably experience some degree 
of affinity, rapport, solidarity, like-mindedness, etc. 
However, the speaker may also repeat previous compliments, indirect 
complaints, denials, echo-questions or ironic utterances or resort to utterances whose 
content is similar to other utterances the hearer may have already produced in the 
past or resembles assumptions already manifest to the hearer. Consequently, such 
utterances would be phatic, for their level of informativeness would be low and they 
could be interpreted as being more oriented towards the relational aspect of 
interaction (Žegarac 1998; Žegarac and Clark 1999). 
The relevance of repeated or recurrent phatic utterances or utterances that may 
resemble the assumptions the hearer already entertains clearly does not reside in the 
assumptions that these utterances make manifest, for those assumptions are already 
manifest to both interlocutors. Their relevance lies somewhere else: in the social 
effects that they may generate (Wilson 2001-2002). Their relevance may certainly lie 
in their contribution to rapport, solidarity and affect because the speaker 
metarepresents assumptions that she senses or has evidence to think are manifest to 
the hearer or are similar to the assumptions manifest to the hearer. These effects also 
depend on the interlocutors’ metarepresentational abilities, as the speaker attributes 
the manifestness of certain assumptions to the hearer. Therefore, when the speaker 
repeats some attitudinal utterances or resorts to recurrent attitudinal utterances in 
previous conversations, the production of those utterances involves a certain amount 
of attributive metarepresentation (Padilla Cruz 2004, 2005, 2007). Since those 
repeated or recurrent attitudinal utterances are assigned phatic interpretations, they 
also transmit the speaker’s attitude of endorsement, acceptance or approval of some 
assumptions that are already manifest to the interlocutors (Padilla Cruz 2004, 2005, 
2007). 
The speaker may know or be aware of the hearer’s point of view about some 
facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs because the hearer or some other 
individual has previously uttered a compliment, an indirect complaint, an ironic 
comment, a denial or an echo-question referring to a specific fact, event, object or 
state of affairs. By repeating or resorting to compliments or indirect complaints 
previously produced by the hearer or another individual, the speaker attributes some 
assumptions to him and provides him with evidence that he also entertains 
assumptions that are similar to those already manifest to the hearer. Consequently, 
the hearer may notice the speaker’s attribution and sense that both of them may 
derive similar logical or contextual implications from the assumptions manifest to 
them. However, what is important to note is that the speaker expresses an attitude of 
endorsement, acceptance or approval towards the content of a previous utterance that 
also conveys an attitude towards that content. 
When ironic utterances, denials, or echo-questions are initially produced by the 
hearer or some other individual, they are per se echoic metarepresentations 
wherewith the hearer attributes the thoughts or utterances mentioned to someone else 
and simultaneously questions, rejects or dissociates from those thoughts or 
utterances. When later on the speaker repeats those utterances or resorts to other 
utterances resembling those the hearer has previously produced, what the speaker 
does is to make an echoic attributive metarepresentation of another previous echoic 
attributive metarepresentation. Therefore, owing to the attributive and echoic nature 
of phatic utterances, what happens when ironic utterances, denials and echo-
questions are repeated later on in subsequent conversations and become phatic is that 
the utterances or thoughts that ironic utterances, denials or echo-questions previously 
made manifest to the interlocutors are metarepresented again. Thus, what can be 
labelled as phatic ironies, phatic denials and phatic echo-questions attributively 
metarepresent utterances or thoughts that previous ironic utterances, denials and 
echo-questions have already made manifest to the interlocutors. Since ironic 
utterances, denials and echo-questions previously produced by the hearer initially 
metarepresented utterances or thoughts that could be attributed to the hearer himself, 
phatic ironies, phatic denials and phatic echo-questions would be echoic attributive 
metarepresentations of those previous interpretive attributive metarepresentations. 
As with compliments and indirect complaints, the assumptions that the speaker 
metarepresents in phatic ironies, phatic denials and phatic echo-questions may be 
similar to those the hearer metarepresented when he firstly produced one of those 
utterances, and to the assumptions he may entertain when the speaker repeats the 
hearer’s words or similar words. As in the situation in which interlocutors do not 
know each other, such similarity involves the possibility of deriving some logical or 
contextual implications. The hearer must sense that the speaker can derive logical or 
contextual implications similar to those he can derive or has already derived at some 
previous moment. Moreover, since those utterances are interpreted as phatic because 
they are repeated and, therefore, have a low level of informativeness, what may be 
highly manifest to the interlocutors is that both of them have a particular attitude 
towards the facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs to which the utterances refer. 
Ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions all transmit a characteristic attitude 
towards their propositional content, and so do phatic utterances. When Ironic 
utterances, denials and echo-questions are repeated in subsequent conversations and 
become phatic, part of their relevance would reside in the joint expression of those 
two attitudes, which merge and combine.  
As Wilson (1999, 2000) puts it, in many cases the relevance of some types of 
utterances resides not only in the expression of one attitude but in a combination of 
attitudes. When compliments, indirect complaints, echo-questions, denials or ironic 
utterances are repeated and become phatic, their relevance lies in the attitude of 
endorsement, acceptance or approval that the speaker expresses towards a previous 
attitude expressed by the hearer or some other individual. Therefore, the relevance of 
those utterances would reside in the attitude of endorsement, acceptance or approval 
that the speaker expresses and projects towards a previous attitude of dissociation, 
rejection, approval, admiration, indignation, frustration, discomfort, etc. already 
expressed by the hearer or some other individual towards a previously 
metarepresented content, i.e. towards previous facts, events, behaviours, states of 
affairs, etc. Such combinations could be labelled as follows: 
- In the case of phatic compliments, agreement/endorsement/acceptance of 
admiration, admiring endorsement or approving endorsement. 
- In the case of phatic indirect complaints, rejecting agreement, agreement in 
frustration/discomfort/dissatisfaction/discontent/anxiety/indignation/disappro
val/rejection (Padilla Cruz, in press). 
- In the case of phatic denials and ironies, agreement in dissociation, approval 
of dissociation, dissociative agreement or rejecting agreement (Padilla Cruz 
2008). 
- In the case of phatic echo-questions, agreement in questioning, approval of 
questioning, questioning agreement or questioning approval. 
These combinations of attitudes would be essential for the generation of rapport, 
solidarity and affect. With phatic compliments, phatic indirect complaints, phatic 
denials and ironies and phatic echo-questions the speaker does not only express a 
certain attitude characteristic of them – an attitude of admiration or approval 
characteristic of compliments, an attitude of frustration, indignation, discomfort, etc. 
characteristic of indirect complaints, an attitude of rejection, disapproval or 
dissociation characteristic of ironies or denials, or a questioning attitude 
characteristic of echo-questions – but also an attitude of endorsement of that first 
attitude, which was originally expressed and projected by the current hearer or some 
other individual. This attitude of endorsement combines with the first attitude 
expressed towards the facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs these utterances 
refer to. With that second attitude the speaker provides the hearer with evidence that 
not only some assumptions from which they can draw similar implications are or 
become manifest to them, but also that the very manifestness of those assumptions 
about particular facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs causes them a similar or 
the same attitude and that the speaker’s attitude is one of acceptance or endorsement 
of the hearer’s past, and probably current, attitude towards them.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the relevance of the so-called attitudinal utterances 
may reside on some occasions in the expression of an attitude which is fundamental 
for the achievement of the effects of solidarity, rapport, reciprocity or association 
associated with these utterances. These effects can arise spontaneously, as a natural 
by-product of utterance comprehension, or can be sought on purpose by the speaker. 
Additionally, this paper has also discussed the mental processes that may take place 
in the hearer’s mind when processing attitudinal utterances for these effects to arise. 
In doing so, this paper has shown that the effects mentioned depend on the 
interlocutors’ metarepresentational abilities, their abilities to derive implications 
from assumptions already manifest to themselves and have intuitions about the 
implications that the other interlocutor can also derive. 
This paper has also argued that, although some repeated or recurrent attitudinal 
utterances about facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs with which interlocutors 
are already acquainted may apparently seem irrelevant because they may make 
manifest assumptions that are previously manifest to the interlocutors (Žegarac 1998; 
Žegarac and Clark 1999), these utterances may also achieve an optimal level of 
relevance because of the feeling of solidarity, rapport, reciprocity or association that 
they can achieve. These feelings can be generated because the speaker attributes the 
manifestness of assumptions about some facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs 
that are also manifest to the hearer, metarepresents those assumptions and expresses 
an attitude of endorsement, agreement or acceptance that blends with another attitude 
that is also already manifest to both interlocutors. With that combination of attitudes 
the speaker shows the hearer that she has the same positive or negative opinion about 
the content of her utterance, which is essential for the generation of the feelings 
attributed to indirect complaints. In turn, for the hearer to achieve the feelings 
mentioned, he has to check that the assumptions manifest to him are similar to those 
metarepresented by the speaker.  
Nevertheless, in suggesting that these feelings can be achieved in the way 
explained here, it is not the aim of this paper to state that they are solely generated 
thus. As extensive research in social pragmatics has shown, the feelings of solidarity, 
rapport, reciprocity or association between interlocutors also depend on other social 
and/or psychological factors, such as the individuals’ frequency of contact, their 
degree of familiarity, the time they have known each other, the (reciprocal) positive 
or negative affect they feel towards each other, a certain feeling of like-mindedness 
when facing specific states of affairs, a possible feeling of comradeship, the social 
power one of them has over the other and the way s/he exerts it, or the relative 
degree of imposition that their actions have upon the other, among others (e.g. 
Brown and Levinson 1987; Spencer-Oatey 1993, 1996; Lorés Sanz 1997-1998). 
Therefore, the attribution of some attitudes and the combinations of attitudes referred 
to in this paper must be taken as some of the many (indispensable) factors that 
contribute to the generation of the feelings associated with attitudinal utterances. 
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